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L STATKi\U:NT OF THE 
A. Nature of the Casc. 
This case is the second lawsuit arising out of a dispute in Pocatello, Idaho. The 
plantiftirespondent, Pocatello Hospital, LLC d/b/a Portneuf Medical Centers, LLC (PM C), and 
Quail Ridgc Medical Investors, LLC (Quail Ridge), were involved in prior litigation that 
concluded in a court trial and an appeal. l Here, PMC filed a Complaint alleging breach of 
contract against two defendants: Quail Ridge and its principle, Forrest Preston (Preston). The 
defendants filed an Answer and Jury Demand. The defendants asserted affirmative defenses and 
included res judicata and collateral estoppel based on the outcome of PMC l. PMC, Quail Ridge, 
and Preston filed motions for summary judgment. The district court heard argument on the 
motions for summary judgment on October 21,2013. The district court granted PMC's motion 
for summary judgment and denied the defendants' motion. This appeal followed. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
PMC filed its Complaint against Quail Ridge and Preston on December 12,2013. (R Vol. 
I, pp. 9-17.) Quail Ridge and Preston filed ajoint Answer and Jury Demand on January 29, 2013. 
(Id., pp. 20-24.) Quail Ridge and Preston requested a stay to the proceedings while PMC I 
proceeded on appeaL (Id., pp. 25-33.) The district court stayed the proceedings but predicated the 
stay on the posting of a bond. The bond was not posted and the district court vacated the stay. 
PMC filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and supporting documents on September 5, 
l The first lawsuit was appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court as Docket No. 40566-2012. It was argued on February 
12,2014, and the case is presently under advisement with the Court. The case will be referred to as PMC 1. 
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) a 
on on 13. 
Tr. 1:1 21, 13.) Court a Judgment on October 13 and 
entered it on October 2013. (R Vol. I, pp. 338-39.) PMC filed a motion requesting attorney 
Quail Ridge and Preston opposed the motion, and the Court granted the motion on January 
8,2014. (Id., pp. 41 1.) Quail Ridge and Preston timely appealed. (Id., pp. 394-97.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
PMC is a Delaware LLC licensed and authorized to do business within the state of Idaho. 
(R Vol. 1, pp. 9-1 Quail Ridge is a Tennessee licensed and authorized to do business 
within the state of Idaho. (Id., pp. 20-24.) Preston is a principle owner of Quail Ridge. (Id.) 
Quail Ridge is an assisted living facility located in Pocatello, Idaho. The assisted living 
center building is located on approximately 4.25 acres in Pocatello, Idaho. The Ground Lease 
Agreement for the facility's real property is the subject of PMC 1. PMC is the owner and lessor 
of the property and Quail Ridge is the lessee. 
As this Court is aware from PMC I, the Ground Lease Agreement dated January 27, 
1983, governs the parties' respective relationship, in part. The Ground Lease Agreement calls for 
a triennial adjustment to the rent paid by the lessee pursuant to Section 1.3(b) ofthe Ground 
Lease Agreement (Id., p. 230.) In PMC I, PMC sued Quail Ridge and Century Park Associates, 
LLC (Century Park) for breach of the 1983 Ground Lease Agreement. (Id., pp. 218-50.) PMC 
specifically alleged in P MC I that Quail Ridge and Century Park both owed adjusted rent for a 
variety of rent adjustment periods, including the 2010 adjustment period. (ld.) 
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a 
two ustmcnt 
& 10. 16,81 to be awarded 
against Quail Ridge and Century Park for 2010 adjustment period. (ld., p. 262.) 
The parties tried PMC Ito the district court on May 14-15,2012. (ld., p. 264-68.) In 
PMC I, the evidence established that the parties restructured their relationship in 2001. (ld., pp. 
271 In 2001, Sterling Development sought to sell the property subject to the Ground Lease 
Agreement. (ld.) Preston, Quail Ridge's owner, wanted to buy the building. (lei.) Sterling's 
to be released from their Lease and 
wanted Sterling released 1rom the financing on the building. (Id.) Sterling owed approximately 
$2.8 million on the building. (ld.) The 2001 restructure resulted in Quail Ridge stepping into 
Sterling's shoes vis-a.-vis the Ground Lease Agreement. (Id.) The parties amended and restated 
the old sublease with Quail Ridge becoming the sublessor and another entity, Pocatello Medical 
Investors LP, remained as subtenant. (ld.) Among other various additions, Preston executed the 
personal guarantee during the 2001 restructuring. (Id.) 
On May 15,2012, at the close of PMC's case, Quail Ridge and Century Park's attorneys 
moved for directed verdict. (ld., p. 265.) The motion requested that the district court dismiss 
Count I (breach of contract) of the Amended Complaint. (Id., p. 265, 270.) PMC's attorneys 
responded to the motion as follows: 
MR. HAWKINS: I can probably stipulate on this and save a little time. I agree exactly 
with what Mr. Gaffney is saying. That hasn't been our strategy in the triaL We feel that 
the way we have alleged the complaint, and especially with the amendment for the 
declaratory judgment, which effectively becomes the adjustment process that we're 
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p. court ,"n'I>t'd with parties and found that PMC had 
opportunity to present evidence of breach of contract and that it did not present any evidence of 
breach of contract for the 2007 and 10 rent adjustment periods. (Id., pp. 265,270.) The distriet 
court granted the directed verdict motion and dismissed the breach of contract claim seeking rent 
for past (2007) and n""'C'P1U (2010) adjustment periods. (ld) The distric court did not allow the 
withdrawal of the contract claim and instead dismissed the claim. (ld.) The district 
court a directed YYln.n",., "'.'':>11eU''''1115 Century Park out of the case. p.265.) 
During post-trial proceedings, Judge Brown expressly found that PMC presented no 
evidence that Quail Ridge had breached the terms of the Ground Lease Agreement. (ld., pp. 273-
77.) Judge Brown stated that there were no facts in the record that would justify entering a 
money judgment in favor ofPMC. (lei.) Judge Brown signed an Amended Declaratory Judgment 
on November 26, 2012. (ld, pp. 141-43.) 
After Judge Brown issued his Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law in PMC I and 
signed the Amended Declaratory Judgment, PMC filed a second lawsuit once more alleging 
breach of contract against Quail Ridge and Preston for the 2010 adjustment period. (ld., pp. 9-
17.) PMC aUeged that due to Judge Brown's findings and conclusions in PlvlC !that it was 
entitled to payment of the $416,812.50 identified in the Amended Declaratory Judgment. (lel.) 
PMC also sought to enforce Preston's personal guarantee. (ld.) 
Both parties moved for summary judgment in Fall 2013. PMC argued that there were no 
Appellant Brief 8 
it to or 
not rent amount for 
Quai! summary 
to have the case dismissed based on the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
(lei., pp. 201-77.) After hearing oral argument on October 2013, Judge Robert C. Naftz 
granted PMC's motion for summary judgment and denied Quail Ridge/Preston's cross-motion. 
(lei., pp. 338-39.) Judge Naftz awarded pre-judgment interest to PMC and also granted PMC 
attorney fees and costs in the amount of$16,830.93. ([d., pp. 413-19.) 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
A. Whether the district court erred granting PMC's summary judgment motion. 
B. Whether the district court erred in awarding attorney fees and costs to PMC. 
III. ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL: ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Quail Ridge and Preston assert that they are entitled to attorney fees and costs in the 
event that they prevail on this appeal. They would be the overall prevailing party in this litigation 
if the matter is reversed and remanded to the district court. As set forth in the Argument section, 
infra, Quail Ridge and Preston are entitled to attorney fees and costs pursuant to Idaho Code 
Sections 12-120(3) & 12-121. Rule 41 of the Idaho Appellate Rules allows for fees on appeaL 
IDAHO R. App. 41 (2013). 
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l.' ) 
A. Standard of Review 
In Groot v. ,)'tandley 14 WL 1 (Idaho Mar. the 
Court outlined the standard of review following a grant of summary judgment. The Court wrote: 
An appeal from summary judgment is reviewed under the same standard a district court 
uses when granting a motion for summary judgment. Under Rule 56(c) of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, and 
admissions on together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue 
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. If the evidence reveals no disputed issues of material fact, then summary judgment 
should be granted. In making this determination, all disputed facts are liberally construed 
in favor of the non-moving party. Circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue of 
material fact. Inferences that can reasonably be made from the record are made in favor 
of the non-moving party. However, the non-moving party may not rest on a mere scintilla 
of evidence. If record raises neither a question of witness credibility nor requires 
weighing the evidence, then summary judgment should be granted. The moving party is 
entitled to jUdgment when the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case. Parkwest Homes, LLC 
v. Barnson, 154 Idaho 678, 682, 302 P.3d 18, 22 (2013) (internal citations and quotations 
omitted). 
[d. at *3. "The fact that the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment does not 
change the applicable standard of review, and this Court must evaluate each party's motion on its 
own merits." Intermountain Forest Mgmt.} Inc. v. La. Pac. Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 235,31 P.3d 
921,923 (2001) (citing Stqfford v. Klosterman, 134 Idaho 205, 207, 998 P.2d 1118, 1119 
(2000)). Questions of law are reviewed de novo on appeal from summary judgment. Steel Farms, 
Inc. v. Croft & Reed, Inc., 154 Idaho 259, 264, 297 P.3d 222,227 (2012). 




IS a case 
not npplying the l\t't" ..... ,." of res judicnta and 
of contract to 
rent for 2010 adjustment period, went to trial on that failed to present 
evidence supporting the claim, and then had that claim dismissed on directed verdict. 
Unsatisfied, PMC sued Quail Ridge again tor breach of contract tor the 2010 adjustment period. 
The second action is entirely based on the failure to pay adjusted rent tor the 2010 adjustment 
period. Res judicata and collateral estoppel specifically exist to preclude repetitive lawsuits on 
or substantially related claims. The district court erred by granting summary 
judgment to PMC against Quail Ridge and Preston. 
Res judicata "includes two legal concepts-issue preclusion or collateral estoppel and 
claim preclusion." Berkshire Investments, LLC v. Taylor, 278 P.3d 943,951 (Idaho 2012). 
"Claim preclusion 'bars a subsequent action between the same parties upon the same claim or 
upon claims relating to the same cause of action. '" Id. The Court wrote: 
Under this doctrine [of res judicata], a claim is also precluded if it could have been 
brought in the previous action, regardless of whether it was actually brought, where: (1) 
the original action ended in final judgment on the merits, (2) the present claim involves 
the same parties as the original action, and (2) (sic) the present claim arises out of the 
same transaction or series of transactions. Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 125-
27, 157 P.3d 613, 618-20 (2007). 
Id. The Berkshire Investments, LLC court described collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, as 
applying to cases when: 
(1) The party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the 
prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue 
sought to be precluded was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final 
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res PMCs 
claims this casco Summary judgment was improvidently entered in favor of PMC and the case 
should be reversed and remanded for dismissal. 
C. Res judicata applies to the bre:lch of contract claim against Quail Ridge. 
1. There was a final judgment on the merits in PMC t. 
The tirst clement of res judicata requires that there be a final judgment on the merits of 
the case. Berkshire Invs .. LLC, 278 P.3d at 951. Here, in PMC /, the dismissal of the breach of 
contract claim by Judge Brown after a motion for directed was a full and complete 
adjudication of the breach of contract claim for the 2010 rent adjustment period. (R Vol. I, pp. 
265,270,273-77.) The district court dismissed the claim without qualification. (Id.) The district 
court entered the dismissal after PMC had its full opportunity to present evidence in suppOli of 
the claim. (ld.) In ShOli, given the fact that there were no qualifications placed upon the dismissal 
of the claim and in light of the Amended Declaratory Judgment entered by the Court resolving 
the sole remaining claim, i.e., the claim for declaratory reliet: the judgment in P Me I was final 
and on the merits. Indeed, Quail Ridge appealed the outcome of P Me I to this Court from the 
Amended Declaratory Judgment. Had the Amended Declaratory Judgment not been final this 
Court would not have allowed the P Me I appeal to proceed.2 Therefore, the first requirement of 
res judicata is present in this case. 
2 PMC did not appeal the dismissal of the breach of contract claims in P Me I nor could it have appealed because 
PMC stipulated to the dismissal ofthe claim on directed verdict. 
Appellant Brief 12 
case the stlme as L 
same 1, never 
case are di than case. Quail 
and PMC were parties to PMC 1. In PMC l, the Court entered an Amended Declaratory 
Judgment in favor of PMC and against Quail Ridge. (R Vol. I, pp. 141-43.) Thus, the second 
requirement of res judicata is satisfied here. 
The case does involve a party that was not a party to PlvfC I: Preston. Preston's presence 
as a party in this litigation does not militate against applying res judicata. Res judicata still 
claim against Preston out of same of 
3. The breach of contract claim arises out of the same transaction or series of 
transactions that involved in PMC I. 
The district court erred in not applying res judicata because both PMC 1 and this case 
involve identical claims for breach of contract for the 2010 rent adjustment period. In P Me l, 
PMC specifically alleged that Quail Ridge had breached the contract by failing to pay adjusted 
rent in the amount of $416,812.50 for the 2010 rent adjustment period. (ld., pp. 255-63.) Here, 
PMC sued Quail Ridge for breaching the contract by failing to pay $416,812.50 for the 2010 rent 
adjustment period. (ld., pp. 9-17.) The claims are the same in both cases. Therefore, the COUl1 
does not even need to analyze this case under the same series of transactions framework. It is the 
same transaction being sued upon by PMC. The claims are the same. 
This lawsuit was not an action to enforce a judgment. PMC did not seek a judgment on a 
judgment. PMC sued Quail Ridge for breach of contract for the 2010 rent adjustment period. In 
granting PMC's motion, Judge Naftz acknowledged that the case was one for breach of contract 
Appellant Brief 13 
not II' L 
cases are to 
of contract I.PMC to do so. 
judicata applies to all claims that could were or could have been brought. Berkshire 
lnvs., LLe, 153 Idaho at 81, 278 P.3d at 951. PMC initially sought relief under the breach of 
contract theory and only added the declaratory relief claim as an afterthought before triaL 
Though PMC could bring an action for declaratory relief prior to breach of an agreement it also 
to bring the claim for breach of contract at the same time. This was a claim that should 
brought irrespective of the declaratory claim. In v. County,681 
P .2d 988 (Idaho 1984), the Idaho Supreme Court held "that the right sought to be protected by 
declaratory judgment 'may invoke either remedial or preventive relief; it may relate to a right 
that has either been breached or is only yet in dispute or a status undisturbed but threatened or 
endangered; but, in either or any event, it must involve actual or existing facts. '" Id. at 991-92 
(citing State ex rei. Miller v. State Bd. of Educ., 52 P.2d 141, 144 (Idaho 1935)). PMC asserted 
its breach of contract claim in P MC I and failed to adduce evidence supporting the claim. The 
dismissal of the breach claim resolved whether Quail Ridge had breached the Ground Lease 
Agreement by not paying the alleged adjusted rent for the 2010 rent adjustment period. 
Alternatively, PMC could have bifurcated its claims and had Judge Brown first declare 
the rights of the parties after a trial. In P MC I, PMC chose to proceed with all of its claims, 
including the claim for breach of contract for the 2010 rent adjustment period, rather than 
holding the breach of contract claim in abeyance while the district court decided the declaratory 
Appellant Brief 14 
to contract 
was 
made poor strategic and ta'-li'-':U decisions in 
PMCl it the breach 0 f contract claims without any evidence 0 f breach. Hence, 
Judge Brown dismissed the claim. If PMC believed that the breach of contract claim was unripe 
then it should have bifurcated or held the claim in abeyance while the declaratory relief claim 
was adjudicated. The judge could have held a separate proceeding at the appropriate time to 
decide breach contract reality is that PMC tried its case, lost, and the district 
court res See, Mining Co. v. 
State, 280 P.3d 679, 682-83 (Idaho 2012). The Court should reverse and remand with an order 
for the district court to dismiss this action with prejudice. 
4. No new sets of facts give rise to a new claim. 
In rendering its oral decision on summary judgment, the district court articulated its basis 
for the ruling as follows: 
I think it's pretty clear that this is an action on a breach of contract case. Judge Brown 
issued his decision. A new set of facts arose, and based on that, a breach of the contract 
action was filed. The Court's decision in this matter is to grant PMC summary judgment 
because of the - because there is no genuine issue of material fact that the Court can find. 
By failing to promptly pay the adjusted rent from the 2010 rent adjustment period 
determined by Judge Brown, Quail Ridge breached its obligation under the ground lease 
agreement. 
Further, summary judgment for PMC is appropriate against Forest (sic) Preston because 
there is no genuine issue of material fact that by failing to pay Quail Ridge's outstanding 
obligations under the ground lease, Mr. preston is in breach of his obligation as a 
personal guarantee. 
It is clear to me that the action is ripe for summary judgment here, and I am going to 
Appellant Brief 15 
L 13.) court was 
claim all of the way through trial. If the breach claim was not ripe, then PMC should have 
obtained a dismissal without prejudice or some other relief. The claim was brought and the issue 
of breach tor the 2010 rent adjustment period was fully adjudicated in P Me l. 
Though it is unclear from the district court's oral ruling deciding the case, it appears to 
have relied upon the reasoning articulated by the Court in Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104 
Idaho 1,663 P.2d 287 (1983). PMC relied on Duthie, for its argument that the claim was not 
ripe for adjudication during PMC 1. There are several problems with PMC's argument and the 
district court erred by relying upon those arguments. This case is not Duthie. 
If the claim was not ripe in P MC I then PMC should not have brought the claim. PMC 
should not have chosen to try its case while asserting the breach of contract claim. Doing so 
subjected the claim to the jurisdiction of the district court and subjected it to potential, and 
actual, dismissal after the presentation of the evidence. As discussed, supra, PMC could have 
done many things differently to preserve the breach of contract claim and avoid a direct verdict 
during PMC 1. PMC could have sought a voluntary dismissal of the claim or could have 
requested to hold the claim in abeyance until after the declaratory relief action. PMC chose not to 
do so and instead placed the 2010 rent adjustment period squarely at issue during the lawsuit. 
Duthie is factually distinct from this case. Duthie constituted the second litigation 
between the parties over the Duthies' right to connect their residence to the Gun Club's domestic 
water line. Id, 104 Idaho at 752,663 P.2d at 288. The Gun Club initially sued the Duthies for 
Appellant Brief 16 
a 
with , 1 
at two years conclusion of case, Gun cut 
the Duthie~:;' waterline, after which the Duthies brought the second action against the Gun Club, 
that res judicata precluded the Gun Club from claiming that the Duthies' license was 
revoked in the second litigation. ld., 105 Idaho at 663 P .2d at 289. 
Tn finding that res judicata did not bar the Gun Club's argument that the Duthies' license 
was revoked, Duthie court cited res judicata precedent, including the following language 
Co. v. Waller: 
We think the COlTect rule to be that in an action between the same parties upon the same 
claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to 
every matter of Ie red and received to sustain or defeat the claim, but also as to every 
matter which might and should have been litigated in the first suit. 
Duthie, 104 Idaho at 753,663 P.3d at 289 (quoting Intermountain Food Equip. Co. v. Waller, 86 
Idaho 94, 98, 383 P.2d 612, 615 (1963) (internal citations omitted»). The Duthie court then 
determined that "because facts OCCUlTed subsequent to the first trial that triggered the filing of the 
second suit, we hold that the issue of revocability was not ripe for trial in the first case, but 
rather, was premature until the license was actually revoked." Id. 
Duthie's facts are dramatically different than this case. In PA1C I, PMC undisputedly 
claimed that Quail Ridge had breached the Ground Lease Agreement by not paying adjusted rent 
in the amount of$416,812.50. (R Vol., pp. 218-63.) This is the same claim that was brought in 
3 According to Justice Bistline's dissent in Duthie, the Gun Club made the propriety of the Duthies' connection an 
issue in the first litigation. Duthie, 104 Idaho at 755, 663 P.2d at 291 (Bistline, J., dissenting). 




not cut nor 
period. (ld., 9-17, 218-63.) Also, unlike Duthie, this case does not involve any question about 
whether a claim "should" or "could" have been brought during the first lawsuit. This case 
involves identical claims being brought in two separate lawsuits. This is not a situation where 
there mayor may not be some cross over between the issues raised in the two lawsuits, which 
was the thrust of Duthie. This is a straightforward situation where PMC sued, lost, and then sued 
to on Res judicata to deal with exact case. 
In the proceedings before the district court, PMC argued that "Judge Brown had already 
opined from the bench in P Me 1 that a breach of contract claim could not be ripe until after the 
court determined the amount of rent due under the lease and the tenant failed to promptly pay the 
rents as adjusted by the court." (R Vol., pp. 425-29.) However, this statement ignores Judge 
Brown's language from the bench after PMC's case-in-chief and upon Quail Ridge's motion for 
a directed verdict on PMC's fIrst breach of contract claim when he said, "I would agree with Mr. 
Gaffney that the evidence that was introduced yesterday was deficient in establishing that there 
has been a breach of contract associated with this matter." (ld., p. 270.) It also ignores the fact 
that Judge Brown never applied a "res judicata analytical rubric" to his decision to grant the 
directed verdict motion. 
Nothing that PMC can argue can circumvent the fact that PMC had its chance to present 
evidence supporting the breach of contract claim during the P Me 1 trial. "[T]he fOlmer 
Appellant Brief 18 
matter to 
m first 104 at 663 P at Intermountain 
Equip, ('0, v. Waller, 86 Idaho 94, 98, 383 P.2d 61 615 (1963) (internal citations omitted»). 
PMC its choice it elected to bring its claim for breach of contract against Quail Ridge in 
P MC I. In presenting its case-in-chiet: including its breach of contract claim against Quail Ridge 
prior to dismissal of the breach claim, PMC offered the matter of its claim for breach of contract 
by Quail Ridge. PMC should be made to face the ramifications of procedural strategy, as 
by PMC l. (See R Vol. 1, This Court should find that res 
judicata precludes PMC from asserting its breach of contract claim against Quail Ridge and 
reverse the district court. 
Duthie is also bad law and the Court should take this opportunity and overturn it. In 
Walker v. Shoshone County, 112 Idaho 991, 739 P.2d 290 (1987), Justice Bistline wrote: 
The [Duthie] Court was then faced with the task of "discovering the COlTect theory." In 
doing so, it had to work around its own concession that the law of res judicata was firmly 
entrenched by prior Idaho cases, none of which were in the least equivocal. 
Id., 112 Idaho at 998, 739 P.2d at 297 (Bistline, J., conculTing). In Olsen v. Olsen, 115 Idaho 
105, 765 P.2d 130 (1988), he commented: 
The doctrine of res judicata is still alive in Idaho although it suffered serious injury at the 
hands of this Court in Duthie v. Lewiston Gun Club, 104 Idaho 751, 663 P.2d 287 (1983). 
In that case a majority of this Court, over the protest of a strong dissent, emasculated 
what had been until then one of the most strictly adhered to principles of Idaho 
jurisprudence by declaring that the doctrine of res judicata need not be applied where the 
circumstances were not "ripe," i, e., that after a judgment became wholly final, a second 
suit involving the same issues previously litigated could nevertheless be brought, 
provided that there was the interjection into the second law suit of some additional fact 
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use water from a 
Gun Club <o"",rprf'n 
It would be a kindness to the trial bench and bar if two more votes were forthcoming to 
erase any precedential effect which may otherwise some day be accorded it. 
Id. at 108, 765 P.2d at 1 (Bistline 1., concurring, n.l). 
D. Res judicata applies to the breaeh of eontract daim against Preston. 
district court when it failed to apply the legal doctrine of res judicata to the 
PMC Preston. PMC >b>'''~>'.J sued Quail Ridge for breach of 
obligation to pay rent under the Ground Lease Agreement, PMC should also have sued 
Preston for breach of the guarantee. The guarantee claim was a claim that should have been 
brought in the prior litigation. It was not asserted at any point by PMC. Thus, claim preclusion 
applies not only to the parties of the original action but also to their privies. "To be a privy, 'a 
person not a party to the former action must derive[] his interest from one who was a party to 
it. '" Berkshire Investments, LLC, 278 P.3d at 951. 
Here, Preston signed the guarantee as a part of the 2001 restructuring of the parties 
agreements. (R Vol., p. 145.) Indeed, PMC's own claims against Preston assert that he is a 
privy because PMC seeks to enforce the rent obligation vis-a.-vis the guarantee. (Id., pp. 9-17.) 
Suing Quail Ridge in P MC I for breach of contract should have resulted in Preston being sued 
under the guarantee. Yet, P MC I did not involve a claim on the guarantee. Claim preclusion 
applies to claims brought or those claims that could have been brought in the prior litigation and 
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on 
The district court crred by not applying the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or 
issue preclusion, to the claim against Preston on the personal guarantee. 
Collateral is "the doctrine that precludes relitigation of the same ll1a 
separate cause of action" and exists to protect "litigants from the burden of litigating an identical 
issue with the same party or its privy." Vawter v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 1 Idaho 903, 318 
P.3d 893, 902 (2014) (citing Rodriguez v. Dep'! (~lCorrection, 136 Idaho 90, 92, 29 P.3d 401, 
403 (2001)). [n Vawter, the Court wrote: 
Court has determined that five factors must be evident in order for collateral 
estoppel to bar an determined a prior proceeding: (1) the pm1y 
against whom the earlier decision was asseI1ed had a full and fair opportunity to litigate 
the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the issue decided in the prior litigation was 
identical to the issue presented in the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded 
was actually decided in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in 
the prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a pmiy or in 
privity with a party to the litigation. 
ld. at 903,318 P.3d at 902. The application of collateral estoppel is a legal question subject to 
free review. Id. All five elements of collateral estoppel existed in this case. The Court should 
reverse and remand for dismissal of the claim against Preston. 
As discussed, supra, PMC could have, and should have, included its claim on the 
guarantee in the prior litigation since it asserted that Quail Ridge did not pay the adjusted rent for 
the 2010 rent adjustment period. Preston's guarantee can only be invoked Quail Ridge failed to 
meet its obligations. (R Vol. I, p. 145.) PMC sued Quail Ridge for breach ofthe Ground Lease 
Agreement for the 2010 rent adjustment period and PMC should have pursued the guarantee in 
P Me I PMC chose not to do so. Thus, the first element of collateral estoppel applies. 
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or 
case. cases, PMC 
IS 
10 rent 
""'''',''rt''rl that Quail 
. [ 
Ground 
Agreement for the 2010 rent adjustment period by refusing to pay $416,812.50, after onsets. 
Third, the issue of whether Quail Ridge breached the the Ground Lease Agreement was 
decided in the prior litigation. (1£1., p. 263, 270.) Breach of contract was fully litigated. 
Fourth, a final judgment was entered and the district court dismiss the breach of contract 
in PMC [without qualification. (ld.) 
as action breach of contract in PlvfC 1 have 
included a claim against Preston on the guarantee. Judge Brown found that PMC had not 
presented any evidence of breach of the Ground Lease Agreement and this should have barred 
PMC from obtaining relief against Preston. (1£1.) By dismissing the breach of contract claim in 
FMC 1, Judge Brown disposed of all grounds for invoking the guarantee against Preston. 
F. The district court erred by awarding attorney fees and costs to PMC. 
Obviously, if the Court vacates the district court's grant of summary judgment to PMC, 
PMC will cease to be the overall prevailing party in the action because it will have acquired none 
of the relief that it sought in the case. Quail Ridge and Preston will automatically become the 
overall prevailing parties in the action as set forth, ir1fra. However, even if the Court finds that 
the district court properly granted summary judgment to PMC, the Court should still reverse the 
district court's decision to grant attorney fees and costs, including the amounts awarded. 
"[AJ trial court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) recognizes the issue as one of 
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an v. 
(2008). 
One of the grounds cited by the district court for awarding attorney to PMC was 
Idaho Code Section 1 121. Ud., pp. 413-19.) The district court erred by awarding attorney fees 
pursuant to this section of the code beause Quail Ridge and Preston presented the district court 
with a legitimate argument based on the law, i.e., res judicata and collateral estoppeL Awarding 
attorney pursuant to Section 12-121 is inappropriate under those circumstances. Clearwater 
LLCv. 1 318 P.3d 944, (20 Quail and 
had a legitimate argument that res judicata and collateral estoppel applied and barred PMC from 
alleging its breach of contract claim. This was a legal issue that the district court gave little 
attention to when it decided the case. Its description of Quail Ridge and Preston's defense as 
unreasonable unfairly characterizes their defense. Quail Ridge and Preston asserted legal 
defenses to the lawsuit in good faith on the basis that PMC had previously sued for breach of 
contract for the 2010 rent adjustment period. The Court should vacate the district court's 
decision relying on Section 12-121 to award fees against Quail Ridge and Preston. 
The district court erred because its decision on attorney fees does not state that the court 
took into consideration the factors identified by Rule 54( e )(3) of the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Courts are required to consider the factors identified in the rule before making an 
award of attorney fees. Irwin Rogers Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Murphy, 122 Idaho 270, 833 P.2d 128 
(Cl. App. 1992). The Court's decision never cites to Rule 54(e)(3) in its section awarding 
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to 41 6. 
or it 
Court "'When a court must 
nlctors set Corth in LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) and may consider any other factor that the court deems 
appropriate.' (citations omitted). Though it is not necessary for the court to address all of the 
LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) tllctors in writing, the record must clearly indicate the court considered all of 
the factors. Id" Id, 146 Idaho at 196 P.3d at 350-51. Allowing district courts the leeway 
to not consider the Rule 54(e)(3) factors is contrary to the entire meaning of that rule, which is to 
the of impacts fees. See v. Leltunich, 
Idaho 435, 111 P.3d 110, 120 (2005). The district court abused its discretion by not 
considering the Rule 54(e)(3) factors because such conduct is not consistent with the applicable 
legal standard. Johannsen, 146 Idaho at 432, 196 P.3d at 350 (citing In re Jane Doe, 145 Idaho 
650,651,182 P.3d 707, 708 (2008)). The amounts awarded are an abuse of discretion. 
The district court erred when it award $1,13 5 .18 in discretionary costs to PMC for legal 
research. These costs were not exceptional and should not have been awarded in the interests of 
justice. Legal research is an ordinary cost incurred by attomeys in every case that they take. 
Every case that results in litigation involves legal research to support motions or to oppose 
motions. Such costs are not exceptional but are routine costs that are a part of the overhead of 
running a law firm. In re Beach, 2011 WL 4963003, *8 (Bankr. D. Idaho October 19,2011). 
Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by awarding PMC its costs for legal research. 
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on appeal. 
matter Quail 
on case will be there will 
nothing left to litigate on remand. They will be the overall prevailing parties in a claim involving 
a commercial transaction. They will also have prevailed in an appeal involving a contract with an 
attorney provision. Therefore, the Court should award Quail Ridge and Preston attorney fees 
and costs in addition to reversing the district court 
Idaho follows the American Rule which entitles a party to attorney fees only when there 
is a contract or statute for an award attorney fees. Mortensen v. Stewart Title Ouar. 
Co., 149 Idaho 437, 447-48,235 P.3d 387,397-98 (2010). Idaho Code 12-121 entitles a 
prevailing party to its attorney fees when a case is prosecuted frivolously, unreasonably, or 
without any basis in law or fact. See IDAIIO CODE ANN. § 12-121 (2013). Where a party knows or 
should know that res judicata will bar the action, further litigation is frivolous. Burns v. Baldwin, 
138 Idaho 480, 487, 65 P.3d 502,509 (2003); Cole v. Kunzler, 115 Idaho 552, 558, 768 P.2d 
815, 821 (Ct. App. 1989). Here, PMC brought a frivolous and unreasonable case against Quail 
Ridge and Preston because the claim for breach of contract had already been litigated in P !vIC l. 
(R Vol. I, pp. 263, 270.) Quail Ridge avoided all liability on the breach of contract claim in P1VfC 
l. (Id.) Reversing the district court's findings in this case and ordering a dismissal results in Quail 
Ridge and Preston prevailing and being entitled to fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 12-121. 
Idaho Code Section 12-120(3) provides for attorney fees in cases where the gravamen of 
the action is a commercial transaction. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 12-120(3). The parties are in a 
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that could for case. Such a would mean that they are 
overall prevailing party in the action. Eighteen Mile Ranch. LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, 
Inc., 141 Idaho 716, 719, 117 P.3d 130, 133 (2005). In Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC, the Court 
likened the avoidance of liability to getting a walk in a game of baseball. Id. The Court wrote: 
A voiding liability is a significant benefit to a defendant. baseball, it is said that a walk 
is as good as a hit. The latter, of course, is more exciting. In litigation, avoiding liability 
is as good for a defendant as winning a money judgment is for a plaintiff. The point is, 
while a plaintiff with a large money judgment may be more exalted than a defendant who 
walks out of court no worse for the wear, courts must not value of a 
successful defense. 
Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc., 141 Idaho at 719, 117 P.3d at 
133. Thus, by avoiding liability in a lawsuit involving a commercial transaction, Quail Ridge and 
Preston "walked" and should be awarded their attorney fees. 
V. CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
Based on the foregoing, Quail Ridge and Preston request that the Court vacate the 
Amended Final Judgment entered by the Court. The Court should reverse its grant of summary 
judgment to PMC and order that the district court enter judgment in favor of Quail Ridge and 
Preston, dismissing the case with prejudice. The Court should award Quail Ridge and Preston 
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